Game semantics is an approach to formal semantics that grounds the concepts of truth or validity on Game theory concepts, such as the existence of a winning strategy for a player. In this framework, logical formulas are interpreted as defining games between two players. The term encompasses several related but distinct traditions, including dialogical logic (developed by Paul Lorenzen and Kuno Lorenz in Germany starting in the 1950s) and game-theoretical semantics (developed by Jaakko Hintikka in Finland).
Game semantics represents a significant departure from traditional Model theory approaches by emphasizing the dynamic, interactive nature of logical reasoning rather than static truth assignments. It provides intuitive interpretations for various logical systems, including classical logic, intuitionistic logic, linear logic, and modal logic. The approach bears conceptual resemblances to ancient Socratic dialogues, medieval theory of Obligationes, and constructive mathematics. Since the 1990s, game semantics has found important applications in theoretical computer science, particularly in the semantics of programming languages, concurrency theory, and the study of computational complexity.
Shahid Rahman (Lille III) and collaborators developed dialogical logic into a general framework for the study of logical and philosophical issues related to logical pluralism. Beginning 1994 this triggered a kind of renaissance with lasting consequences. This new philosophical impulse experienced a parallel renewal in the fields of theoretical computer science, computational linguistics, artificial intelligence, and the formal semantics of programming languages, for instance the work of Johan van Benthem and collaborators in Amsterdam who looked thoroughly at the interface between logic and games, and Hanno Nickau who addressed the full abstraction problem in programming languages by means of games. New results in linear logic by Jean-Yves Girard in the interfaces between mathematical game theory and logic on one hand and argumentation theory and logic on the other hand resulted in the work of many others, including Samson Abramsky, J. van Benthem, Andreas Blass, Dov Gabbay, Martin Hyland, Wilfred Hodges, R. Jagadeesan, Giorgi Japaridze, E. Krabbe, L. Ong, H. Prakken, G. Sandu, D. Walton, and J. Woods, who placed game semantics at the center of a new concept in logic in which logic is understood as a dynamic instrument of inference. There has also been an alternative perspective on proof theory and meaning theory, advocating that Wittgenstein's "meaning as use" paradigm as understood in the context of proof theory, where the so-called reduction rules (showing the effect of elimination rules on the result of introduction rules) should be seen as appropriate to formalise the explanation of the (immediate) consequences one can draw from a proposition, thus showing the function/purpose/usefulness of its main connective in the calculus of language (, , , , , ).
If the formula contains negations or implications, other, more complicated, techniques may be used. For example, a negation should be true if the thing negated is false, so it must have the effect of interchanging the roles of the two players.
More generally, game semantics may be applied to predicate logic; the new rules allow a principal quantifier to be removed by its "owner" (the Verifier for existential quantifiers and the Falsifier for universal quantifiers) and its bound variable replaced at all occurrences by an object of the owner's choosing, drawn from the domain of quantification. Note that a single counterexample falsifies a universally quantified statement, and a single example suffices to verify an existentially quantified one. Assuming the axiom of choice, the game-theoretical semantics for classical first-order logic agree with the usual model-based (Tarskian) semantics. For classical first-order logic the winning strategy for the Verifier essentially consists of finding adequate and witnesses. For example, if S denotes then an equisatisfiable statement for S is . The Skolem function f (if it exists) actually codifies a winning strategy for the Verifier of S by returning a witness for the existential sub-formula for every choice of x the Falsifier might make.Jaakko Hintikka and G. Sandu, 2009, "Game-Theoretical Semantics" in Keith Allan (ed.) Concise Encyclopedia of Semantics, Elsevier, , pp. 341–343
The above definition was first formulated by Jaakko Hintikka as part of his GTS interpretation. The original version of game semantics for classical (and intuitionistic) logic due to Paul Lorenzen and Kuno Lorenz was not defined in terms of models but of winning strategies over formal dialogues (P. Lorenzen, K. Lorenz 1978, S. Rahman and L. Keiff 2005). Shahid Rahman and Tero Tulenheimo developed an algorithm to convert GTS-winning strategies for classical logic into the dialogical winning strategies and vice versa.
Formal dialogues and GTS games may be infinite and use end-of-play rules rather than letting players decide when to stop playing. Reaching this decision by standard means for strategic inferences (iterated elimination of dominated strategies or IEDS) would, in GTS and formal dialogues, be equivalent to solving the halting problem and exceeds the reasoning abilities of human agents. GTS avoids this with a rule to test formulas against an underlying model; logical dialogues, with a non-repetition rule (similar to threefold repetition in Chess). Genot and Jacot (2017) proved that players with severely bounded rationality can reason to terminate a play without IEDS.
For most common logics, including the ones above, the games that arise from them have perfect information—that is, the two players always know the of each primitive, and are aware of all preceding moves in the game. However, with the advent of game semantics, logics, such as the independence-friendly logic of Hintikka and Sandu, with a natural semantics in terms of games of imperfect information have been proposed.
and Helge Rückert extended the [[dialogical|Dialogical logic]] approach to the study of several non-classical logics such as [[modal logic]], [[relevance logic]], [[free logic]] and [[connexive logic]]. Recently, Rahman and collaborators developed the dialogical approach into a general framework aimed at the discussion of logical pluralism.
More recently and the team of dialogical logic in Lille implemented dependences and independences within a dialogical framework by means of a dialogical approach to intuitionistic type theory called immanent reasoning. S. Rahman, Z. McConaughey, A. Klev, N. Clerbout: Immanent Reasoning or Equality in Action. A Plaidoyer for the Play level
Games are played between two agents: a machine and its environment, where the machine is required to follow only computable strategies. This way, games are seen as interactive computational problems, and the machine's winning strategies for them as solutions to those problems. It has been established that computability logic is robust with respect to reasonable variations in the complexity of allowed strategies, which can be brought down as low as logarithmic space and polynomial time (one does not imply the other in interactive computations) without affecting the logic. All this explains the name “computability logic” and determines applicability in various areas of computer science. Classical logic, independence-friendly logic and certain extensions of Linear logic and intuitionistic logics turn out to be special fragments of computability logic, obtained merely by disallowing certain groups of operators or atoms.
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For an application of the dialogical approach to intuitionistic type theory to the axiom of choice see S. Rahman and N. Clerbout: Linking Games and Constructive Type Theory: Dialogical Strategies, CTT-Demonstrations and the Axiom of Choice
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Computability logic
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